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ABSTRACT
Three related papers recently argued for the adoption of specific ‘organizing principles’ for
academic research in Information Systems. These principles, centered on nomological networks
of IT artifacts, are offered as prescriptions which, it is argued, resolve an ‘identity crisis’ in IS
research. The present paper concludes that, rather than resolving an identity crisis, the
prescriptions are likely to confound any search for identity by biasing future IS research into
directions that do not move the field forward. We show how a positive science of Information
Systems can retain the benefits sought without the recommended prescriptions.
Keywords: IT artifacts, nomological networks, scientific method, IS core
I. POSITIVISM IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Within the academic discipline of Information Systems, three recent articles by Benbasat and
Zmud [2003], Orlikowski and Iacono,[2001]; and Weber [2003], argue for a scientific system – or
as Weber alternately called it, an ‘organizing principle’ – which could define the research
approaches, methodologies and, some might suggest, even the topics included in the IS
discipline. All three put forth arguments for the need for better governance over IS research –
arguments that address academic politics, the future health of IS research, and the
methodological demands of the discipline. Both the Benbasat and Zmud and the Orlikowski and
Iacono articles make detailed recommendations concerning the guidelines and principles to which
research papers should conform, and suggest allowable and proscribed topics. Weber provides
more general and circumspect arguments, as befits a journal editor.
The issues raised in these three papers have been raised at one time or another in all of the
social sciences. More importantly, the pursuit of answers in other disciplines yielded answers
and critiques of alternatives that would be foolish to ignore in our own field. It is my purpose here
to review how each of these suggestions stands up to methodological trends in other 21st century
sciences, many of which are further along in defining the dictates of their research than we are.
By looking at their ‘scientific systems’ I would like to suggest the manner in which Information
Systems research can put itself on an equal footing with other academic disciplines both in the
natural sciences and in the social sciences.
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WHAT IS IN THIS PAPER
In this paper, I address a relatively extensive set of issues germane to Benbasat and Zmud’s
[2003] system of IS research – some broached in their paper, and others reflecting assertions on
which the Benbasat and Zmud system is predicated.
In Section II, I question whether the IS field is truly suffering an ‘identity crisis’, or whether the
supposed ‘identity crisis’ is merely a ‘straw man’ thrown up to subvert the field towards the ends
of a subset of IS researchers. By chronicling the evolution of technology, business
implementation, and strategy since the 1950s1 I show how rapid change and inherent fluidity in
information technology can be misrepresented as an ‘identity crisis’.
In Section III, I suspend judgment in order to explore Benbasat and Zmud’s prescription for their
supposed ‘identity crisis’: imposing on the field a taxonomy of ‘IT artifacts’ which dictate
‘acceptable’ research. I will show that the Benbasat and Zmud system will tend to censure
relevant, high quality research, while rewarding antiquated dogma. I argue that the harm to IS
research of such a system could be significant and possibly irreparable. To succeed, IS research
needs to avoid dogma, and grow more fluid and multi-disciplinary.
Sections IV and V investigate specific assumptions on which the Benbasat and Zmud system is
predicated. In section IV, I show that the two cornerstones of the Benbasat and Zmud system –
errors of exclusion; and errors of inclusion – in fact derive from a classical fallacy. Fallacious
reasoning undermines Benbasat and Zmud’s claim to scientific validity, and would make IS
research less credible, in turn damaging the influence of IS in business schools.
Section V looks specifically at the origins and application of nomological networks – the central
machinery invoked by Benbasat and Zmud to implement their dogma. Deductive-nomology, and
nomological networks lost philosophical credibility throughout the 20th century, and now are
relegated to mainly descriptive endeavors like document indexing.[Bringsjord, 1999] The current
state of nomology may be adequate for Benbasat and Zmud’s system, since they only want to
use nomological networks as a vehicle for indexing their ‘IT artifacts.’ But I will present evidence
that even in this domain, the Benbasat and Zmud system departs significantly from the reality of
academic research publication.
Section VI details what I believe can provide an effective alternative to the Benbasat and Zmud
system for Information Systems research – a positive science2 of Information Systems. Most
scholarly disciplines embraced positive research methodologies over the past century – in
particular the business research disciplines starting with Milton Friedman’s championing of
positive methods in economics. Friedman (1953) describes a positive science as one that
constructs theories through inferences gleaned from ‘experiments’, (the perspective adopted in
this paper) in contrast to a descriptive science which he likens to an ‘analytical filing system.’ The
Chicago School was founded on the presumption that positive inferential science predicates
either descriptive or normative science. Led by Friedman, it became a major influence on
economics, law, sociology and other social sciences over the last half century I also discuss the
consequences, supported by historical examples, of adopting one or another approach in
research.
The arguments of Section VI are reinforced in Section VII which summarizes my conclusions
about the applicability to Information Systems research of one of the most successful of the 20th
century’s scientific systems – ‘positive’ science. A closer inspection of ‘positive’ science is, in
1

See El-Sawy [2003] for an alternative chronology.

2

Positive science is also referred to as ‘positivism’ although the latter term is most often associated with the
system of Auguste Comte that stresses attention to actual practice over consideration of what is ideal.
Friedman’s adaptation of Keynes’ positive science more directly addresses the concerns of 21st century
business research.
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particular, warranted by Benbasat and Zmud’s appeal to deductive-nomological explanations, a
construct that grew out of the 20th century positivist movement in the natural sciences.
II. IS THERE REALLY AN IDENTITY CRISIS?
Before inquiring into the merits of Benbasat and Zmud’s prescription for the IS research ‘identity
crisis’ it is useful to assess whether indeed this ‘identity crisis’ exists, or whether ‘the crisis’ is
merely a Straw Man thrown up in support of an alternative agenda. I would first like to explore
the retrospective study which engendered Benbasat and Zmud’s prescriptive advice for IS
research. In the process, I will take a closer look at the theory that underlies the prescriptions,
and the consequences of Benbasat and Zmud’s proposed system. A positive methodology of
Information Systems could effectively circumvent specific biases and problems identified in IS
research by Weber and could prevent the stagnation inherent in authoritarian prescriptions.
There may, in fact, be more reasonable explanations than an ‘identity crisis’ for the failure of a
few stable ‘core’ topics to coalesce in IS research. Business schools, like other professional
schools, tend to grow around moneyed constituencies that can fund research, endow chairs, hire
students, and otherwise provide support. Within business schools, for example, the accountants
have the accounting firms; finance banks and brokerages; and marketing and strategy have
consulting firms.
Information Systems perpetually faces a moving target with elusive
constituencies. This assertion is not a justification to avoid seeking an ‘identity.’ Rather I
suggest that IS faces a more difficult task in defining useful and meaningful bounds for its identity
than other business disciplines. Any ‘identity’ we fabricate will be inherently fluid and usually less
precise than we might like.
Table 1 is my attempt to track shifts in the types of IS research, information systems, and their
constituent groups over the past four decades, and into the next.
Readers can take issue with the details of these shifts in focus and ‘IT artifacts,’ but the regularity
of five year shifts is discernable. Shifts in the technology engendered at least three major shifts
in management principles since the early 1960s.
•

The first occurred after the introduction of IBM’s 360 on April 7, 1964, the product of
the greatest capital investment in history up to that time (IBM spent $5 billion and
hired 60,000 new employees). Once they adopted S/360s, the number of people
involved in central bookkeeping operations of large firms like Ford and Dupont
dwindled from several thousand to several hundreds, and accountants like Harold
Geneen rose to dominate corporate strategy.

•

With the introduction of the Apple II on April 1, 1980, and subsequently the IBM PC,
businesses found a tool to break the stranglehold of the mainframe data processing
department. Empowerment, speed of decision making and islands of technology
were obsessions of 1980s corporate culture. Salesmen like Lee Iacocca became the
celebrity managers of the day. The securities industry was revolutionized when
traders like Michael Milken divested power to their sales forces through desktop
computers.

•

Strategy shifts at Microsoft and Netscape in the summer of 1995 heralded a third
managerial shift. This shift introduced the virtual office, salesmen-less sales through
web retailing, and increasing delegation of decision making to machines, sensors
and actuators. People who actually understood the behavior of these machines,
people like Bill Gates, Michael Dell, and Larry Ellison became the celebrity CEOs of
the day.
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Table 1: The Elusive Identity of IS
Period

Information Systems

IS Constituencies

IS
Research
(Artifacts)

Early 1960s

Unit record processing on punched
cards

Data Processing Shops

FORTRAN, Algorithms,
Punched Card Workflow

Late 1960s

Centralized IBM mainframe with
dedicated staff for I/O

IBM Programmers

COBOL, Data Operations,
Data Structures

Early 1970s

Database management and CICS
shift mainframe I/O to the users

Database and network
administrators

Hierarchical Database
Models / Management

Late 1970s

Office automation and workflow
around departmental groups
dominate business; various types of
‘decision support’ systems (plain,
group, executive) are promoted

Systems integrators,
Decision Support,
Outsourcing

MIS, Office Automation
Models, Business Systems
Planning, Flowcharting and
HIPO

Early 1980s

Personal computers introduced

Microcomputer systems
developers and vendors,
Interface designers, PC
programmers

DSS, Relational DBMS, DB
Normalization

Late 1980s

Client server takes off, empowering
workers and distributing computing
power around the firm

Corporate knowledge base
designers, network
administrators

CASE Tools, GDSS,
Systems Design and
Analysis, Reengineering,
Critical Success Factors

Early 1990s

GUI interfaces take off with Windows
3.1, Client-server for organizational
knowledge sharing and decision
making

PC Interface and
Interaction programmers

Knowledge Engineering,
Executive Information
Systems, Islands of
Automation, Outsourcing

Late 1990s

Web takes off, distributing power and
information around the globe, ERP,
CRM

E-commerce companies, IT
Consulting

Internet, e-Commerce,
Economics of IT, Charts vs.
Tables, Value Chain
Integration

Early 2000s

Embedded systems take of, Wireless
networked devices overtake the PC

Consumer electronics
designers, Video Game
interface designers

Virtual Organizations, IT
Enabled Business Models,
Financial Models of
Technology

Late 2000s
(predicted)

‘On Demand’ Computing, Personal
robotics take off

Robotics interface
designers, HR,
Organizational Structure
and Design

Future Managerial Problems
in Technology

Early 2010s
(predicted)

Mesh webs of smart devices
permeate all human activity

IT Policy makers,
Government

Future Managerial Problems
in Technology

The regularity of these shifts exposes a risk in relying on retrospective studies to define the field.
Only a small percentage of past topics or conclusions are likely to be relevant in the current
environment. Results grow obsolete and irrelevant very quickly, and scholars and businesses
that rely on these results are likely to make incorrect decisions. We can’t expect a ‘central core’
composed of stale research to chase a moving target effectively; particularly if it moves at an
accelerating rate if Moore’s Law and similar predictors of progress in technology continue. The
mathematics is straightforward: if the lag between research and publishing is three or even five
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years, and if IS shifts every five years, then less than 20% of a ‘central core’ based on 10 year
retrospective citation studies will actually be relevant to current information systems. And very
little if any of the new technology in the field will ever appear in the derived ‘core’ defined in this
way. Very old research would tend to be highly ranked, simply because it was around longer.
Exacerbating the problem with an artifact-centric approach to research is that artifacts themselves
take time to create, gather, aggregate, filter and write up, creating an even longer time lag
between an artifact’s emergence , and its resultant investigation in IS publications. Engineers in
the hardware disciplines (mechanical, civil, electrical, chemical) certainly don’t wait for artifacts (or
the scholars gathering them) to improve performance through innovation. It seems odd to expect
their counterparts in the business and management of IS to do the same.
The word ‘artifact,’ which is so central to Benbasat and Zmud’s and Orlikowski and Iacono’s
systems, conjures up notions of antiquity. An artifact is “an object produced or shaped by human
craft, especially a tool, a weapon, or an ornament of archaeological or historical interest.”
[Dictionary, 2000] This definition seems at odds with a field whose subject matter is cutting-edge
technology that is constantly changing and improving. Yet closer readings of both Orlikowski
and Iacono and of Benbasat and Zmud suggest that this is honestly what they intended. It fits
well with their general tenets of IS research as a centrally governed descriptive taxonomy
incorporating little new technology and giving extra credibility to old research. The designation
‘IT artifact’ is very apt indeed.
Management author Peter Drucker conveys the risk of letting historical artifacts tyrannize new
ideas in his impressions of IBM founder Thomas Watson Sr. “… if there had been a Harvard
Business Review during the 1930s, it would have run stories about him, and he would’ve been
considered a nut or a crank.” [Maney, 2003] Drucker was commenting on what the business
community thought of Watson’s ‘data processing’ idea – a term that Watson coined, and which
seemed far fetched to his business associates. If legitimacy had been up to the journals of his
time, neither the IS industry, nor an IS research discipline would exist today.
Accounting, finance, and other business school disciplines traditionally serviced much more
stable constituencies than IS, although current industry upheavals may confront them with their
very own ‘identity crises’ in the near future. If indeed this change happens, we can perhaps
derive some comfort from knowing that the pervasion of information systems throughout
bookkeeping, securities trading, supply chains and product markets is largely responsible for the
ensuing chaos.
So is the ‘identity crisis’ real, or are we merely ignoring our constituencies? From a static
viewpoint, the rapid change in industry may indeed look like an ‘identity crisis.’ But it is a bit
difficult for me to believe, in a large field such as IS, with a diversity of talented and intelligent
researchers, that we are not blessed with a surfeit of ideas and perspectives to guide us. We
may not all agree on what the ‘identity’ of IS research should be, but, then, isn’t this the sign of a
healthy, inquisitive discipline? The ‘identity crisis’ to which Benbasat and Zmud allude may well
be the receding mirage of past research well-done and at one time important, but which no longer
finds many interested constituents.
III. PICKING WINNERS
Predicated on their claim that IS research does indeed have an ‘identity crisis,’ Benbasat and
Zmud prescribe a solution. It is a relatively draconian solution, involving a central governing
authority that determines – a priori – which research topics may or may not be considered IS
research. They make arguments (which I will explore shortly) to justify the correctness of picking
‘core’ topics a priori, rather than allowing ideas to stand or fail based on their merits. In other
sciences, core topics are usually determined ex post facto through a system of checks and
balances involving experiments and other evidence.
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Whatever the intellectual merits of Benbasat and Zmud’s prescription, there are pragmatic
concerns. The pragmatic issue that came almost immediately to the minds of those I know who
read Benbasat and Zmud was that of the politics of the field – who exactly is this proposed
governing authority that will be picking winners (and losers), and on what criteria will they
choose?
The criteria for picking winners are succinctly defined in Benbasat and Zmud in terms of the ‘IT
artifacts’ specified first in Orlikowski and Iacono, plus another concept, the ‘nomological net.’
Since ‘IT artifacts’ and ‘nomological nets’ are claimed to be central to our ‘identity crisis’ and
prescriptions for its resolution, I’d like to delve a bit further into the meanings of these terms.
Orlikowski and Iacono begin with the precept that the only acceptable subject matter in IS
research should be ‘information technology artifacts’: “bundles of material and cultural properties
packaged in a socially recognizable form such as hardware and software.” They offer scant
justification for this idiosyncratic perspective, which seems odd given that hardware, at least, is
usually presented in discussion, research, and the press in terms of its physical, mechanical and
electrical characteristics. This is not to say that their unique perspective of ‘cultural properties
packaged in a socially recognizable form’ is not valid; just that it needs to be better articulated if it
is to be useful for prescribing the dictates of a field of research.
By its nature, the greatest impact of Benbasat and Zmud’s prescriptions will appear in the
journals. Other effects, it can be argued, will be knock-on effects given the central role of
scholarly journals in research institutions. The winners in Benbasat and Zmud’s governance
system will, of course, be those researchers whose careers focus on ‘core’ topics – topics
sanctioned by the central authority. Their papers will be accepted to IS journals, they will be
tenured into IS positions, and they will come to dominate editorial boards. The losers face
banishment as gypsy scholars in lesser institutions with heavy teaching loads and miserable
research funding.
Because of the central role journals play in Benbasat and Zmud’s system, it is useful to look at
the historical roles, as well as prediction of future roles that journals will play in a research
discipline and its evolution. Among the earliest research journals were the Proceedings of
meetings of the Royal Society in the 17th century. In that time, the act of publishing scientific
inquiry was controversial, and widely ridiculed. Publishing was expensive and scientists typically
just circulated their papers, letters, or work-in-process among a small group of peers. It was not
at all unusual for a new discovery to be announced as an anagram, reserving priority for the
discoverer, but indecipherable for anyone not in on the secret. Both Newton and Leibniz used
this approach. This method did not work well at all. Merton, a sociologist, found that in cases of
simultaneous discovery in the seventeenth century, 92% ended in dispute. This number dropped
to 72% in the 18th century, 59% by the latter half of the 19th century, and 33% by the first half of
the 20th century [Andrade,1954]. Steady acceptance of the modern scientific paper was largely to
credit for the decline in contested research.
The Royal Society was steadfast in its unpopular belief that science could only move forward
through a transparent and open exchange of ideas backed by experimental evidence. Many of
the experiments were ones that we would not recognize as scientific today – nor were the
questions they answered. For example, when the Duke of Buckingham was admitted as a Fellow
of the Royal Society on June 5th 1661, he presented to the Society a vial of powdered ‘unicorn
horn.’ It was a well-accepted ‘fact’ that a circle of unicorn’s horn would act as an invisible cage
for any spider. Chief experimenter Robert Hooke emptied the Duke’s vial into a circle, and
dropped a spider in the center, which promptly walked through the circle and off the table. In its
day, this was cutting edge research. But colleagues might rightly question our sanity were we to
investigate ‘unicorn artifacts’ today.
The invention of the research journal was so successful that both the number of journals and of
papers proliferated over the past few decades. As a result, the topics covered in any single
journal tended to narrow, and readership and citation declined. Odlyzko [1997, 1998, 1999,
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2000] provides compelling evidence that journals will evolve into something akin to Internet
forums over the coming decade, by extending the interactivity of current Internet preprints. This
change will likely open them to a greater range of ideas, some more developed than others (very
similar to the ideas that permeate a forum). Forums, like markets, tend to thrive or fail based on
their ability to attract talent. Highly restrictive and tightly monitored forums are least likely to
thrive.
The most ambitious effort following Odlyzko’s suggestions is probably that of Harold Varmus,
director of the US National Institutes of Health, for a global website centralizing biomedical
literature. Varmus plans for PLoS Biology and BioMed Central to provide author-funded, full
access to the entire biomedical research literature for anyone with a computer and an Internet
connection. It would technically be simple for many journals (including CAIS) to follow this
formula once the editorial decision is made [Harmon, 2002]. These trends, which Odlyzko shows
are irreversible for economic reasons, will favor greater transparency and exchange of ideas, and
will limit any attempts to impose autocratic control over research topics.
IV. APPEAL TO AUTHORITY
Let’s now review the merits and weaknesses of underlying theory invoked in Benbasat and
Zmud’s prescriptions for IS research. Benbasat and Zmud intend for their system to be
regulative – that is to prescribe and regulate the conduct and publication of IS research in the
future. They say:
“Our specific concerns herein involves two troubling trends regarding the current
conduct of IS research: errors of exclusion of constructs reflecting the core
properties of the IS discipline, i.e., the IT artifact and its immediate nomological
net, and errors of inclusion of constructs that lie outside this scope.” (p. 186)
Their so-called ‘troubling trends’ regard the failure of IS academics to restrict their research to
officially sanctioned topics: “the IT artifacts and their immediate nomological net” in the vernacular
of Benbasat and Zmud. The choice of these officially sanctioned topics is not clearly identified
within the text of the paper, but allusions are made to one specific authority: Howard Aldrich, a
University of North Carolina sociology professor. Ironically, by their own standards of inclusion
and exclusion of expertise in addressing research questions, Benbasat and Zmud should have
selected someone else, as Aldrich is neither an expert in Information Systems, nor in the
philosophy of science. Nevertheless, in an attempt to identify the legitimacy of particular topics in
IS research, the following assertions are made:
1. Aldrich is (or at least is claimed to be) an authority on legitimacy of research
disciplines.
2. Aldrich claims that two types of scientific legitimacy exist: “cognitive legitimacy”
and “sociopolitical legitimacy” 3; and
3. Therefore, “cognitive legitimacy” and “sociopolitical legitimacy” as defined by
Aldrich provide an exhaustive set of assessment criteria for the legitimacy of any
IS research.
This line of argument represents a classical fallacy – the Appeal to Authority. The conclusion
that, “cognitive legitimacy” and “sociopolitical legitimacy” as defined by Aldrich should provide an
exhaustive set of assessment criteria for the legitimacy of IS research is fallacious. Even if it

3

Aldrich’s definitions of these terms are quoted out of context, so it is not clear that Aldrich truly argued that
these terms provide an exhaustive basis for scientific legitimacy, or were even intended to be applied in
arguments of scientific legitimacy to specific fields, like IS.
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were not, we would want to question why – on topics of scientific legitimacy – we should defer to
scholars in sociology over those in philosophy of science which specifically addresses the domain
and methodologies of academic disciplines. These indeed are troubling trends, but not in the
sense that Benbasat and Zmud intended. What is ‘troubling’ is weakly argued theory invoking
dubious constructs.
V. FINDING NOMO
‘Nomological nets’ – a concept central to Benbasat and Zmud’s prescriptions for the IS ‘identity
crisis’ – are constructs that appear in psychometrics, micro-level citations studies, information
science, as well as in artificial intelligence, and epistemology. The nomological network is an
idea that was developed by Cronbach and Meehl [1955] as part of the American Psychological
Association's efforts to underpin psychological testing with philosophical theory, where the main
focus was to determine the construct validity of psychological testing metrics. Their strategy was
to invoke the formalism of philosophical theory to link the theoretical realm with the observable
one. This network would include the theoretical framework for what you are trying to measure, an
empirical framework for how you are going to measure it, and specification of the linkages among
and between these two frameworks. Unfortunately, their ‘nomological network’ never did provide
a practical and usable methodology for assessing construct validity. Nomological networks were
abandoned in psychometrics after development of the multitrait-multimethod matrix. By the
1980s, even Cronbach was recommending that the field abandon nomological networks for a
contextualist approach that clearly defines the boundaries of test score use [Cronbach, 1988].
Cronbach and Meehl did their work at the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, where
they were strongly influenced by Herbert Feigle and Michael Scriven, proponents of Carl Gustav
Hempel’s philosophy; particularly ideas presented in Hempel’s, [1950; 1952] treatises on
language. It should be noted that, in the 1950’s Hempel’s philosophy did not yet encountered the
criticism that would reveal its flaws. Thus Cronbach and Meehl were probably justified in trusting
that they devised a consistent formal system for psychological construct validity, even if it proved
useless in practice
Cronbach and Meehl’s nomological networks are central to both Benbasat and Zmud’s system,
as well as being of central concern in citation behavior. Thus it is worthwhile to explore the
origins of Hempel’s nomological artifacts in philosophy in the quest to better understand the
epistemology of so-called ‘nomological nets.’
Carl Gustav Hempel started his career in the philosophical camp of logical positivism, but then
moved on to his own deterministic version at odds with that camp. Hempel’s deductivenomological explanation of a ‘fact’ is a deduction of a statement (called the explanandum) that
describes the ‘fact’ we want to explain; the premises (called the explanans) are scientific laws and
suitable initial conditions. For an explanation to be acceptable, the explans must be ‘true’ [Hempel
and Oppenheim, 1948].
According to the deductive-nomological model, the explanation of a fact is thus reduced to a
logical relationship between statements: the explanandum is a consequence of the explanans.
Pragmatic aspects of explanation are not taken into consideration; this approach can lead to
some very strange conclusions, as I will illustrate later. Another feature is that an explanation
requires scientific laws; facts are explained when they are subsumed under laws.
The language of Hempel’s ‘deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation’ has been
merged into the language of citation analysis where it provides convenient formalism, similar to
what was attempted in psychometrics. From the standpoint of citation behavior, where a broad
range of words found in literary citations need to be represented in a universal notation, the
explananda and explanans from such ‘deductive-nomological explanations’ provide a convenient
basis for the nodes on a network of perceived relationships between these concepts.
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When psychometrics and citation analysis adopted the language of Hempel, they neglected other
artifacts from logical positivism: specifically fundamental assertions that scientific laws are not
genuine statements, because they are not completely verifiable; they are rules employed to make
predictions. The only criterion for justifying scientific laws is the reliability of forecasts; causal laws
express nothing but the possibility to make a prediction.
Hempel’s idiosyncratic interpretation of logical positivism suffered repeated criticism over its life.
The logical positivist Peter Railton believes that Carl Hempel belongs to a class of philosophers
who are reluctantly bound to the determinism of the 19th century. Railton [1978] asserts "… the
aim of probabilistic explanation is not to demonstrate that the explanandum fact was nomically
expectable, but to give an account of the chance mechanism(s) responsible for it." Railton rejects
the requirement for all explanations to adhere to the deductive-nomological schema. Hempel
was eventually compelled to provide a predictive extension to his system, in the form of his
Inductive Statistical model of explanation. Unfortunately, he later discovered that his approach
suffered from serious flaws, leading Coffa [1974, p. 141] in his article Hempel’s Ambiguity to
declare this reason enough that "Hempel’s views on inductive explanation ought not to be
accepted."
In short, several decades ago, Hempel’s philosophy seemed to be able to provide a convenient
language for expressing certain ideas in psychometrics and citation analysis. But Hempel’s
system of deductive-nomological explanations eventually proved useless as a tool for scientific
investigation. Its inconsistencies and flaws relegated it to little more than a footnote, an
intellectual cul-de-sac, in 20th century thought.
WEIRD SCIENCE
Hempel’s deductive-nomological approach can be used to draw some seriously odd conclusions.
Here is one example. Hempel [1973] criticizes logical positivism's distinction between
observational and theoretical terms, providing an example in Hempel [1988] concerning the
inferential function of scientific theories. He argues that it is impossible to derive observational
statements from a scientific theory. As an example, he gives Newton’s theory of gravitation. This
theory, he argues, cannot determine the position of planets, even if the initial conditions are
known, because Newton's theory deals with the gravitational force, and thus the theory cannot
forecast the influences exerted by other kinds of force. In other words, Newton's theory requires
an explicit assumption – a provisoe, according to Hempel – which assures that the planets are
subjected only to the gravitational force. Without such hypothesis it is impossible to apply the
theory to the study of planetary motion. But this assumption does not belong to the theory.
Therefore the position of planets is not determined by the theory, but it is implied by the theory
plus appropriate assumptions. Accordingly, observational statements are not entailed by the
theory, and there are no deductive links between observational statements. Hence it is impossible
that an observational statement is a logical consequence of a theory (unless the statement is
logically true). The peculiar implication is that the empirical content of a theory does not exist.
According to such interpretation, scientific theories are rules of inference, and thus are
prescriptions according to which observational statements are derived. Hempel's analysis shows
that these alleged rules of inference are void.
Bottom line: Hempel concludes that Isaac Newton’s theory of gravitation tells us nothing about
why or how the Earth orbits about the Sun, despite the fact that Newton’s theory of gravitation
was used successfully to predict eclipses, trajectories, and to put a man on the moon.
Nomological networks and deductive-nomological explanations could, if taken to the extreme, be
used to show that the Earth sits at the center of the Universe, that unicorns are real, and all sorts
of other pseudoscientific artifacts. Is this the sort of theory we want underpinning IS research?
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ISI: THE MINISTRY OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
The main defender of citation analysis is also its primary beneficiary. ISI4 publishes the Social
Science Citation Index, among numerous other databases. For this reason alone, questions over
the legitimacy of citation analysis can and do elicit heated debate.5 ISI always acknowledged the
limits of citation analysis, but the lure of generating reams of output by blindly parsing databases
proved irresistible. Since ISI was sold by its founder, Eugene Garfield, in the early 1990s, it
reacted to this demand by producing software packages to help users probe its database, while
charging for access as well.
ISI fields experts to defend the validity of citations wherever debate over their validity arises,
much as the tobacco companies send lobbyists into every debate over smoking. The money
involved is significant; the cost of buying certain ISI data rose almost fourfold between 1995 and
2003.
ISI’s role in widening the use of citation analysis is self-serving. It is also accused of
underestimating the risks and biases inherent in these studies. Benbasat and Zmud and
Orlikowski and Iacono base their conclusions on citation analyses, in the tradition of co-citation
studies from the 1980s by Swanson and Culnan [1987] with the aim of describing ‘core’ research
areas in IS. Both studies were based on research methods used in seminal work by White and
Griffith [1981]. White and Griffith originally set the format for citation analysis research as a way
of identifying ‘coherent groups akin to schools’ in a discipline. Importantly, neither prescriptive,
normative, nor regulative claims were made for the approach. Results were simply intended to
provide descriptive summaries of recent history and current ‘schools’ in a discipline. Cozzens
[1989] articulates a widely held assumption that citations are merely another form of internal
evidence to be considered in conjunction with external evidence for the author's proposed
addition to the corpus of knowledge about the nature of reality.
A more insidious problem arises from the very nature of ‘schools’ within a discipline.
Comparisons between fields tend to be meaningless. For example, mathematics researchers
rarely cite more than one or two references, whereas a typical paper in molecular biology
includes dozens. Similarly, mathematics papers tend towards being sole authored, while papers
in biology, medicine and physics may be by dozens of authors. Similar though less extreme
differences can be found in the IS ‘schools.’ In such environments, cohort group and self-citation
will bias the ‘core’ towards fields in which papers tend to be coauthored. In addition, citation
analysis tends to favor:
1. areas of research that are relatively unchanging over time;
2. small coalitions publishing in narrow areas; and
3. methodology papers.
THE DIFFUSE ‘CORE’ OF IS
Both Benbasat and Zmud and Orlikowski and Iacono make implicit Appeals to Authority by
limiting the journals that they include in their scope, arguing that these are the only ‘authoritative’
IS journals. Orlikowski and Iacono distill their taxonomy from a retrospective study of a decade of
publications in only a single journal: ISR. Not surprisingly, they discovered ‘core’ areas in IS that
are quite similar to those identified in Swanson and Culnan’s study a decade and one-half earlier
– vivid proof of conservative bias in the methodology.
The inherent risk in such a narrow study is that you will miss most of the work that appeared in IS
research. IS researchers publish in around 120 pure IS journals and around 200 related journals
[Peffers and Tang, 2003] . Only a tiny fraction of their output can physically appear in ISR which
4
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The different issues in the debate are nicely summarized in the news feature “Citation analysis: The
counting house” [Nature,2002].
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only publishes around 25 articles a year. Bibliometrics researcher Per Seglen [1997] found that
about 15% of the articles in a typical journal account for half of the citations gained by that
publication. This percentage means that a typical paper in a journal with a high impact factor may
not, in fact, be cited much, and may not even be considered significant, important or ‘core’
research at all. He concludes that the reputation of ‘major’ journals depends on the impact of
only a few papers, and that influential papers in a research discipline tend to be scattered across
a broad range of journals. This conclusion is consistent with the argument above that the top
journals run the risk of censoring many truly innovative works6. This fact alone clearly indicates
that parsing only one or two journals for the ‘core’ of a discipline is a flawed, and is almost certain
to exclude the actual ‘core’ topics in the discipline. Seglen also discovered that journals that
predominately publish review articles tend to be cited most, and that the number of citations is
further biased by the topical areas in which the research is conducted – that in some topics, small
cliques of researchers will gratuitously co-cite each other, driving up their statistics in the ISI
databases, vastly overweighting the perceived significance of their research.
Seglen’s findings may understate the situation in IS research. The average citation count at any
of the leading IS journals tends to be quite low, perhaps less than one citation per paper per year.
At the same time, a survey by Peffers and Tang [2003] identified 326 journals recognized by IS
researchers as publication outlets, reflecting an exceptionally high dispersion of IS research
across journals. Perhaps these figures should not surprise us. Throughout the 1990s, IS
enabled corporate reengineering was the major force breaking down ‘stovepipes’ and internal
fiefdoms in organizations. Consequent innovations in IS are therefore likely to appear in a wide
range of outlets. These same organizational trends are also widening the range of interests in
other business disciplines (e.g., e-commerce amongst Marketing faculty, electronic markets and
microstructure in Finance). IS set this trend, and it is only natural for IS research to embrace a
broadening of the field and its potential research outlets. Furthermore, Prusak and Davenport
[2003] conducted research that suggests that a diffuse core may be the rule rather than the
exception in business research of all sorts. Thus the diffuseness of an IS core should not
surprise us.
The likelihood that citation analysis restricted to one or two journals will miss the significant
intellectual trends in the field is, thus, high in IS, and will increase with the number of journals in
which IS researchers publish. Restriction of our ‘core’ search to just one or two journals, though
easier to perform, is likely to produce meaningless results. It is likely to miss the most significant
intellectual movements in the IS discipline.
The consequences are clear. If these systemic biases in citation analysis are allowed to define
the bounds of IS research, the topic matter of academic IS will consistently lag that of industry
and vendors, and IS research will indeed grow irrelevant. If business school administrators and
accreditation boards now consider IS as expendable, then defining the boundaries of the field in
terms of past subject matter can only exacerbate our problems. And expect the Harvard
Business Review to publish more articles to the theme of Carr’s ‘IT Doesn’t Matter.’[Carr, 2003]
VI. TRENDS IN 21ST CENTURY SCIENCE
An extensive literature in the philosophy of science describes the manner in which various
possible perspectives of science can be used to conduct research inquiries. In the social
sciences, these approaches broadly fall into three categories:
1. positive science, provides a body of systematized knowledge concerning what is;

6

Some argue that ‘journals publish what they have published’. That is, as journals age, they develop
specializations. As a result, authors send papers to them that are likely to be accepted because they are of
the same type as appear in the journal.
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2. normative (also called prescriptive or regulative) science provides a body of
systematized knowledge discussing criteria of what ought to be; and
3. descriptive (also called interpretive) science concerns the way in which the
objects of scientific study are expressed in the language.
In his influential essay The Methodology of Positive Economics, Nobelist Milton Friedman [1953]
cites the influence of logician John Neville Keynes in first defining these categories in a
meaningful way in the social sciences. In the natural sciences, concepts of positive and
descriptive science had been debated from antiquity. Friedman’s essay likens descriptive
science to an ‘analytical filing system’ of science: tautologies that are important for the internal
consistency of any intellectual discipline, but which necessarily are predicated on the antecedent
of a positive science that constructs theories through inferences gleaned from ‘experiments.’
Descriptive science is language shorn of inference.
Viewed solely as a language, theory
contains no substantive content; it is a set of tautologies. Its function is to serve as a filing system
for organizing empirical material – a taxonomy. The criteria by which theory can be judged are
those appropriate to a filing system. Are the categories clearly and precisely defined? Are they
exhaustive? Do we know where to file each item, or is there considerable ambiguity? Is the index
system so designed that we can quickly find an item we want? Are the items we want to consider
filed together? Does the filing system avoid elaborate cross-reference? The answers to these
considerations depend on both formal logical, and situation-specific factual considerations.
Ultimately, some questions in a deductive science will be unanswerable –as guaranteed by
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem which proved the impossibility of a comprehensive selfcontained logic. Such questions would not be able to adapt by borrowing building blocks from
other fields because such moves would place the research on a taboo, in-between boundary that
doesn’t fit nicely into the existing taxonomy.
In contrast, a positive science tests the legitimacy of a single hypothesis; or perhaps a population
of competing hypotheses that carry varying degrees of strength based on their past predictive
performance, by comparing its predictions with experience. In theory, there are no unanswerable
questions in positive science (though obtaining the answers may, in many cases, be prohibitively
costly); by the same token, there are no immutable ‘truths’ or indisputable ‘facts’ either. The
hypothesis is rejected if its predictions are contradicted either frequently or more often than are
predictions from an alternative hypothesis. The predictions need not be about unobserved events;
data may be artificially censored to use the theory to ‘predict’ events already observed. A
hypothesis is accepted if its predictions are not contradicted, and the hypothesis may become
generally accepted if it survives many opportunities for contradiction. Factual evidence can
never ‘prove’ a hypothesis; it can only fail to disprove it.
Friedman’s insights were not particularly novel; he was merely bringing into the social sciences
insights that permeated the perspective and conduct of research in the natural sciences after the
turn of the 20th century. These insights arguably motivated establishment of the great European
research societies – The Royal Society in London, and the Académie des Sciences in Paris.
Both were founded in the 17th century to promote experimentation and to overturn the Aristotelian
descriptive science dictated by the medieval church. Physicist Max Tegmark [2003] comments
that the intellectual tension between these two scientific paradigms
“… arguably goes as far back as Plato and Aristotle. According to the Aristotelian
paradigm, physical reality is fundamental and mathematical language is merely a
useful approximation. According to the Platonic paradigm, the mathematical
structure is the true reality and observers perceive it imperfectly. As children,
long before we had even heard of mathematics, we were all indoctrinated with
the Aristotelian paradigm. The Platonic view is an acquired taste.”
Modern scientists are Platonists by necessity. The objects of scientific study are now so far
outside direct sensory experience that it is seldom possible to build useful theories from human
observations.
Human senses simply are not built to deal with subatomic particles at one

The IS Core XII: Authority, Dogma, and Positive Science in Information Systems Research by J.C. Westland

148

Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 13, 2004)136-157

extreme; and galaxies at the other. Mathematical models are needed to describe and predict
reliably across the full range of phenomena that 21st century science studies. In the social
sciences, these mathematical tools are often statistical7 [Stigler, 2002]
Delving a bit further into the distinctions between these research approaches, consider that until
late in the Renaissance, three Greek philosophers – Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle – defined
much of the received wisdom of the world. The first of the three, Socrates, refused to write down
his ideas, insisting that to do so dulled the memory. The growth in complexity of science all but
relegated the Socratic approach to polite discourse after hours and over a beer.
Socrates’ pupil, Plato, was a champion of reasoning through problems in a constantly shifting
world, dividing the world into ideas or objectives which were permanent; and into phenomena,
which were measurements or perceptions of those ideas and objectives. According to Plato, you
were limited in the information about the world of phenomena that could be gained through
measurement and the senses. Only reasoning through a problem or situation goes straight to the
idea. Plato’s star pupil, Aristotle, carried on this tradition, though he took fundamental issue with
Plato’s philosophy. The son of a physician, young Aristotle followed his father in making detailed
taxonomies of the anatomies of animals and their behavior in the wild. These taxonomies
engendered a “bookkeeping” mentality, and a dedication to rigid rules of logic that distinguished
him from the more inquisitive Plato. Aristotle’s rule-laden taxonomies segued with the divine
authority of the medieval church, and reigned well into the modern era.
The success of mathematics in predicting previously unknown phenomena – in relativity,
quantum mechanics, and other fields –pushed the natural sciences into the Platonic camp.
Plato’s ideas and demeanor seem most attuned to the world of the 21st century. This conclusion
perhaps reflects the psychological attitude needed by scientists to address the increasingly
complex phenomena they are called upon to study. The Platonic view embraces argument and
discovery centered on idealized models (theories and hypotheses), allowing rapid advancement
and innovation is science. It avoids the evasion and weasel words of Socratic Method. It eschews
the mindless checklists and structure of Aristotle. It seeks a holistic picture of a discipline that
embraces open-ended inference, innovation and change.
THE TYRANNY OF TAXONOMIES: A HISTORICAL PARABLE
The logical positivists were obsessed with the indeterminacy and uncertainty revealed in
Einstein’s theory of relativity (which showed that locations and motion were relative, not absolute)
and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem (in response to Bertrand Russell’s paradox), and quantum
phenomena (first noted in Einstein’s 1905 paper on the photoelectric effect). Their response was
to construct new theories of inference which would encompass this new science. In contrast,
Hempel’s determinism can be seen as a nostalgic attempt to recapture the certainty and
determinism of Aristotle.
A historical parable illustrates the dangers inherent in a central authority dictating the scientific
investigation. In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas fused the philosophies of Aristotle and
Augustine relating to scientific inquiry. In Aristotle’s teachings, one of the significant ‘facts’ about
nature was that all things were combinations of the four elements: air, fire, earth and water;
another ‘fact’ was that the Earth was stationary, and the Sun revolved around the Earth.
In this environment, investigation by experiment was considered impious, and could lead to
dangerous transgressions. Galileo Galilei – known to his academic peers as ‘the wrangler’ – ran
afoul of the Inquisition and was placed under house arrest for the remainder of his life. His
transgression was to refute Aristotle in his Dialogue on the Great World Systems, Ptolemaic and
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Copernican [Galileo,1632], a book that was quickly added to the Index of Banned Books
maintained by the Inquisition. Galileo’s authorship earned him excommunication by the Church,
for his impious conclusion that the Earth orbits the Sun. Not until 1992 did Pope John Paul II
vindicate Galileo and officially concede that the Earth was not stationary – that it revolved around
the Sun. The wheels of justice and truth turn slowly in a tyranny of taxonomies.
An interesting ‘citations’ angle to the Galileo’s tragedy is that the Index of Banned Book
established the concept of ‘authorship’ in the modern world. Before the Index – issued by Pope
Paul III as a part of the reformation –establishment of ownership of intellectual property, or of
authorship was not clear. Medieval texts often went unsigned, and if a name was attributed, it
was often the scribe who had compiled the book, or a benefactor who had employed the scribe.
The Index was the original citation list. Until the Inquisition began keeping the Index, knowledge
was thought to be immutable, and authorship unimportant. The Inquisition elevated authorship to
a position of importance, by identifying banned works and those responsible for them.
We are now full circle. Citations are ultimately the stuff of nomological nets, following the
precepts of Hempel’s notation where the explananda and explanans from ‘deductivenomological explanations’ provide the ‘IT artifacts’ that comprise the nomological network. The
parable of Galileo should make clear the dangers of such an approach presented as a normativeregulative theory of Information Systems research. Such systems are likely to be narrow, rigid,
and incapable of incorporating experimentation or inference into its framework. This inherent
conservatism will surely lead to pitfalls that parallel those in medieval Aristotelianism:
1. An intellectual despotism that declares significant ‘facts’ about Information
Systems as being irrefutable; ‘artifacts’ as being immutable; with discourse
frustrated by a weary, bickering tyranny of catalogers;
2. Editorial policies at major journals which adjudicate that any investigations into
‘facts’ cannot be considered a part of IS research, and thus cannot be
publishable in IS journals;
3. Proscriptions on publishing experimental research, which even if they do not
prohibit it completely, force the interpretations of that research to be shown to be
consistent with ‘facts’ laid down in the nomological nets of IT artifacts; and
4. Academic discourse that favors the creation of artifacts – neologisms,
explananda and explanans – over inferences about underlying behavior.
POSITIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE SCIENCE
Can the dangers and shortcomings in the system presented in Benbasat and Zmud be
satisfactorily resolved? I think the answer is ‘yes’ if we are allowed to jettison the baggage of
‘artifacts’ from Hempel’s deductive-nomological explanations. In their place we should opt for
mainstream logical positivism, rather than the Hempel’s flawed philosophical cul-de-sac. It is to
this end that I want to dedicate the last part of this paper.
John Neville Keynes [1917] points out that positive science deals with ‘what is’ not with ‘what
ought to be.’ The Orlikowski and Iacono paper makes a similar claim in spirit (p.130) regarding
their own arguments, so they are likely not to object to positive research couched in this manner.
The task of positive research is to provide a system of generalizations that can be used to make
correct predictions about the consequences of any change in circumstances. Its performance is
to be judged by the precision, scope, and conformity with experience of the predictions it yields.
From this standpoint, a positive science is ‘objective’ in the same sense as any of the natural
sciences such as physics and chemistry. However, there are complications; IS deals with the
interrelationship of people and machines and the investigator is also a part of the subject matter
being investigated. These complications raise specific difficulties in ensuring objectivity at the
same time that they provides the researcher with a class of data not available to the natural
scientist.
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The interaction between experimenter and object of the experiment is sometimes used to
disparage the social sciences for their inability to conduct so-called ‘controlled experiments.’ But
similar problems exist in astronomy, where just as in the social sciences, it is impossible to
replicate an experiment completely. Other issues arise in physics, where the process of
observing the position of subatomic particles affects the precision of the measurement of
momentum (the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle). No experiment can be completely controlled,
and every experience is at least partly controlled in the sense that some disturbing influences are
relatively constant during its course. ‘Control’ is a matter of degree.
In contrast to the deductive nomology of Hempel, positive sciences don’t recognize absolute and
immutable ‘truths,’ ‘facts’ or ‘artifacts.’ Rather hypotheses are built from assumptions, axioms, or
postulates that, for the sake of convenience, are considered true within a particular context. As
an example of the character of these assumptions consider Isaac Newton’s take on the falling
apple. An apple, or any other body with mass, in a vacuum at sea level, falls a distance d that is
a function of time t and the gravitational acceleration g where d= gt2/2. If we drop a metal ball
from a second story flat, we can expect this formula to describe the acceleration of the ball
accurately. In contrast, if we drop a feather, expect a very poor prediction of the acceleration of
the feather, and an indication that the model needs to be extended to include air pressure. Or
assume that the experiment is conducted 10 miles above sea level where the gravitational
acceleration is different. Newton, in pondering how his hypothesis broke down at the extremes
of the ranges of his parameters, developed two new constructs: mass and the gravitational
constant. These ideas were coined by Newton because entirely new concepts were required to
explain observations in an expanding array of experiments. It is this sort of inference into
underlying behavior that I think best justifies the creation of new concepts.
Newton himself had a difficult time with both the mass and the gravitational constant concepts, as
was indicated by the numerous revisions that he made to his Principia Mathematica. Within the
context of Newtonian physics, both were immutable quantities; but later investigations by Einstein
showed them both to be mutable at high speeds or around large masses. Logical positivism was
to a large extent a reaction to the insights provided by Einstein’s theory of relativity and
subsequent 20th century developments that revolutionized physics and logic. Positivism
endeavored to create scientific systems that could embrace the new discoveries in physics at the
turn of the 20th century in a way that the deterministic systems could not.
Descriptive science and normative science, on the other hand, cannot be independent of positive
science. Descriptive science – the process of gathering observations – is a necessary part of
data collection that precedes positive research. Normative-regulative science – the policy
decisions concerning ‘what should be’ – can only intelligently be founded on ‘what is’ – the
conclusions of positive research. Most arguments over policy center on the consequences –
economic, welfare, and political –resulting from disparate predictions of the expected outcome,
rather than to fundamental differences in basic values. Questions in industry about whether a
system will truly lower expenses, provide competitive advantage, or allow better decision making
will almost never be about objectives (lower costs, competitive advantage and good decisions are
usually seen as desirable outcomes), rather they are about the predictions of how a particular
system will operate in the future in the environment in which it is implemented. .
The ultimate objective of a positive science is the development of a theory that yields valid and
meaningful predictions about phenomena not yet observed. Such a science does not deduct its
theories from first ‘truths’ or immutable ‘facts.’ Rather it is a complex inferential ‘language’
designed to promote systematic and organized methods of reasoning. Positive science eschews
arbitrary ‘facts’ for a series of hypotheses that form a body of theory which is effectively able to
tell us about a reality that is not yet fully comprehended.
The validity of a hypothesis in this sense is not itself a sufficient criterion for choosing among
alternative hypotheses. Observations are necessarily finite; potential hypotheses infinite. There
may be support for multiple hypotheses at any time, and the dialectic surrounding the predictions
of these various hypotheses provides a healthy environment for inquiry. Such academic
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environments are never orderly, nor are they easily managed under a single governing authority.
But they promise greater innovation and progress than the restrictions of the ‘filing system’ of
deductive science. Deductive or interpretive science is necessary, but should be seen in the light
of its role in helping to construct, tes,t and select hypotheses.
Friedman puts an interesting twist on Occam’s Razor in pursuit of this goal. He considers a
theory simpler if it requires less initial knowledge to make a prediction; it is more fruitful the more
precise the resulting predictions, the wider the area within which the theory yields predictions, and
the more additional lines for further research it suggests. Logical completeness and consistency
are relevant, but play a subsidiary role; their function is to assure that the hypothesis says what it
is intended to say and does so alike for all users of the theory. The users themselves provide the
checks and balances for a research discipline (whether they are in industry, academe, or
anywhere else).
Positive research in Information Systems will be more than the sum of its tautologies if it is able to
predict, and not just describe the consequences of actions. Empirical evidence is crucial to two
different aspects of positive IS research:
1. in constructing hypotheses and
2. in testing their validity.
The description of a hypothesis can only be considered complete if its tautological implications
are not contradicted in advance by experience that has already been observed. Additional
observations may then be used to deduce facts capable of being observed but not previously
known. These predictions can then direct additional observations, the gathering of new evidence
, in a perpetual chain of questions and answers. Such free-ranging inquiry, unbeholden to a
central authority, is the hallmark of modern, positive science.
CIVIC DUTIES: THE NATURE AND ROLE OF EXPERIMENTS
‘Good citizenship’ in research starts with sound experimental design motivated by testable
hypotheses. It would be fruitless to belabor the extensive literature on experimental design here.
here. But if the IS discipline is to push forward the bounds of knowledge, and is to be useful to
anyone, then links between theory and observations need to be articulated clearly.
Good citizenship considers the other researchers who will build on your work. If the researcher is
a theorist, then good citizenship means that this researcher also assures that the hypotheses
generated by their research are testable – that potential experiments, metrics, and criteria for
validation or falsification are clearly articulated. On the other hand, if the research is
experimental, descriptive, or interpretive then there must be a clear statement of the hypothesis
being addressed, the problem being solved, its importance, and its constituencies. These
obligations are owed the academic community at large.
Vague allusions, weasel words, and poorly articulated concepts, no matter how entertaining or
colorful, do a disservice to the research community. They confound understanding by forcing
endless debate over definitions of terms, predictive implications, and claims to authorship. They
slow discovery by making it difficult to design experiments or to test the hypotheses put forward.
They penalize those who follow up one’s research, by giving short shrift to measurement,
validation and experiments.
These standards of ‘good citizenship’ exist for a reason – where they are not practiced, research
makes little progress at great expense, the field lacks an ‘identity’ because it lacks testable
hypotheses, and researchers become more interested in the ‘prize’ of another line item on their
vita, rather than in the general advancement of knowledge.
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Experiments are demanded as an integral part of positive research. Positive research can be
seen as a cascade of decisions, each decision exacting constraints on the next decision in the
cascade (Figure 1).

Assumptions,
Interpretations

Testable
hypotheses
(models)
Metrics,
Functional
relationships and
Conclusions to
be tested

Experiments,
Observations
Figure 1. Research Decisions
Seldom does one research project or paper cover all four decisions. It is more likely that
particular projects may address only one or two of them. But, because each decision is either
motivated by, or must be validated or refuted by other decisions, every project is obligated to
suggest experiments, hypotheses, or any other constructs needed to complete the cascade.
If your project involves defining a new theory, hypothesis, model, system or method (i.e., the
‘testable hypothesis’) then it seems reasonable to expect
1. assumptions that must be explicitly stated in terms that allow the hypotheses
associated with the project to be tested, and
2. suggestions for specific tests, along with the particular metrics used to evaluate
those tests; and
3. that the researcher should be able to specify some constituency interested in the
hypothesis, and indicate how much validating / refuting it would be worth.
To meet these criteria, formal logical or mathematical exposition of the testable hypothesis is
recommended; nebulous terms – e.g., strategy or consumer satisfaction, should be clarified by
stating specifically how these quantities would be measured, and where the data would be
collected.
If an experiment is being conducted, then it seems reasonable to expect that:
1. it should specifically validate or refute some stated testable hypothesis;
2. if the testable hypothesis was nof articulated prior to this research project, then it
seem reasonable to expect a complete articulation of the model, its constituents,
and its significance; and
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3. the experiment should reach a conclusion on whether the model revision is
warranted, and what revisions are needed.
The optimal strategy for a field then, at minimum, is an ongoing cycle between
1. analysis / rationalization / merging of empirical findings into a coherent corpus of
knowledge and
2. empirical testing of logical implications arising from that corpus. Favoring one
point of view to the point of excluding the other might prevent this cycle from
operating.
Positive research in Information Systems would presume that all experiments are driven by the
statement of testable hypotheses. Data collection, interpretation, and reporting of results are most
convincing when statistical. The ultimate validation criterion is whether the testable hypothesis is
able to predict future unobserved events and states; perhaps not perfectly, but with estimable
error.
VII. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR IS RESEARCH
Once they established their criteria for legitimacy of topics and research in IS, Benbasat and
Zmud continued by attacking particular research topics as illegitimate. This attack, I think,
foreshadows the general use that would be intended for their system, and thus deserves
inspection. One area taken to task is research ‘associated with a customer’s product
understanding’ which according to them ‘are in the domain of marketing, and are better left to
scholars in marketing – scholars with more expertise in such matters.’ At least three problems
result from such a parochial view. First, this view reinforces the traditional ‘stovepipe’ view of
academe in an era when industry is obsessed with breaking down these same stovepipes. In fact,
information technology itself is largely responsible for the integration of disparate disciplines.
The current academic ‘stovepipes’ are outdated artifacts themselves – the finance, accounting,
marketing, and strategy ‘stovepipes’ date only from the 1950s, when Harvard Business School
revised its curriculum to reflect the ‘stovepipes’ within Proctor & Gamble, the most admired firm of
the day.
Second, individuals within a particular ‘stovepipe’ may, in fact, not have all of the expertise to
adequately address the topic in question. This lack of full knowledge is one reason that firms are
now so keen to break down these antiquated stovepipes.
Finally, great breakthroughs in science often resulted directly from disciplinary cross-pollination
For example, Mendel’s genetics resulted from the application of statistics to agriculture and
relativity from the application of mathematics to physics. The innovator’s dilemma is how to break
down existing stovepipes. Ideally our research discipline would recombine good ‘genes’ from
other disciplines into IS research to help our own body of knowledge to adapt and grow efficiently,
as opposed to the xenophobic cataloging of old genes to assure that they stay unsullied by
foreign genetic material.
For the IS discipline to embrace Benbasat & Zmud’s narrow view of science would be unhealthy,
and surely bound to stifle progress in the discipline, relegating it to a slough of irrelevancy. If
adopted as standards for IS research, they would very likely bias the research agenda, leading to
a decline in the relevance and quality of IS research, while discouraging a broad base of
participation in the field.
It would be a tragedy of first proportion to watch Information Systems research decline as a
discipline at the same time that information systems grow to become the single most dominant
force in the economic success of firms, products, and nations. The choice confronting the
Information Systems discipline is clear. The so-called ‘identity crisis’ within the discipline can be
resolved in one of two ways:
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1. By dictating a set of ‘core’ topics that are approved for IS research. Then the major
question confronting the discipline is “Who has authority to dictate the ‘core’ topics?”
Exactly the same conundrum confronted the Enlightenment academics attempting to
tackle the inconsistent and sometimes silly conclusions drawn by medieval Aristotelians.
Whether authority resides with senior academics in the field, or in the precedent set by
prior citations in particular journals, the end result is likely to be a tyranny of obsolete or
antiquated ideas; and a conservative research environment that discourages, or in the
extreme proscribes, research that is innovative, iconoclastic, and relevant.
2. By institutionalizing methodologies of a positive theory which embraces inference and
experimentation, and on which normative-regulative opinions may be based.
Such
methodologies do not constrain a priori, the topics which researchers may investigate.
They do assure that conclusions that are drawn meet specific measures of quality,
accuracy, and external validity. Positive research in Information Systems invites debate
and experiment – both a requisite of any healthy academic discipline. Positive theory
lacks the order and comfort of Aristotelian dogma; in return it allows disciplines to remain
dynamic and open to new insights.

In my opinion, rapid and ongoing changes in Information Systems make a positive science of IS
the best alternative to provide future research direction for the IS field. A positive science
encourages the exploration, argument, and discovery centered on ideals and objectives that will
keep the discipline relevant to industry. The choice for IS academics is clear – there are two
roads down which IS research may pave its future.
One ends at the Museum of IT Artifacts, haunt of ghosts that once were demigods.
The other road opens vistas without end, in pursuit of new ideas and challenges. This road
demands more effort – you can’t afford to rest on your artifacts. But its rewards are
commensurately greater. Travelers on this road share their delight in lively discourse in ideas,
the excitement of new discoveries, and the experiments which assure that truth and knowledge
are ultimate victors in any dispute.
I know which road I intend to travel.
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